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Barriers and Opportunities Under the
1994 Argentine Constitutional
Amendments for Both Environmental
Protection and the Sustainability of the
Socio-Economic System
DR. JuAN RODRIGO WALSH AND DR. DANIEL SABSAY
Dr. Sabsay is a constitutional lawyer who has published a
book on recent constitutional reforms in Argentina. Dr.
Walsh is an environmental lawyer, practicing with the firm
of Marciel, Norman & Associates in Buenos Aires, and the
program director for FARN. 1
In their dialogue, these attorneys identify the barriers
and opportunities under the 1994 constitutional amendments
for creating an integrated legal system that promotes both
environmental protection and the sustainability of the socio-
economic system. In this analysis, the following points are
examined: the creation of new categories of environmental
rights and duties; jurisdictional conflicts, not only between
national, provincial and municipal governments, but also be-
tween the executive and the legislative branches of govern-
ment; the new constitutional obligation to remediate
environmental damage; the procedural remedies for environ-
mental harm; and the creation of a system for environmental
regulation at the national level.
1) Walsh and Sabsay explain that Article 412 contains
many features that make it a unique constitutional amend-
ment. The amendment guarantees Argentine citizens the
right to a healthy and balanced environment. It charges both
the national and provincial governments with the duty of pro-
1. Fundaci6n Ambiente y Recursos Naturales.
2. CONST. ARG., art. 41.
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tecting this right. Article 41 also provides that the govern-
ment is responsible for the preservation of natural resources
and has an obligation to provide environmental information
and education.
Unfortunately, the way this amendment was drafted
makes it difficult to resolve the jurisdictional conflicts among
levels and branches of government that exist under current
environmental statutes. One response to this confusion is the
recent establishment of the Federal Council on the Environ-
ment (COFEMA), formed under a compact between the na-
tional and provincial governments whose charge includes the
resolution of these conflicts. Ironically, the existence and op-
eration of COFEMA itself manifest the legal conflicts inher-
ent in the Constitution; to date there is no indication that this
new entity is going to be competent to resolve these issues.
2) The jurisdictional ambiguity of Article 41 may present
the provinces an opportunity to create regional entities to co-
ordinate their policies and programs with the national gov-
ernment at the regional level. This may be necessary to
protect natural resource areas that are shared by two or more
provinces and to accomplish other constitutional objectives
such as the protection of biological diversity and the cultural
heritage of the nation. A clear limitation on the powers of
any regional confederation of this sort is that its recommen-
dations, under law, have to be ratified by the individual pro-
vincial legislatures. How such entities can be used to resolve
the tension between the power of the provinces and the au-
thority of the National Congress over interstate commerce is
far from clear.
3) The ambiguity of Article 41 is heightened by the pro-
visions of Article 124, 3 which continue the previous constitu-
tional delegation of authority over natural resources to the
provinces. In the opinion of Sabsay and Walsh, Article 124
gives plenary authority over these matters to the provinces.
Article 41 means that this plenary authority must be exer-
cised within the context of threshold national standards for
the protection of the environment, which the national govern-
3. CONST. ARG., art. 124.
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ment must establish. It may resolve the contradictions
within Article 41 to see the National Congress as charged
with establishing minimum standards for environmental pro-
tection while continuing provincial authority for natural re-
source planning and protection within this national scheme.
This interpretation would give the national government the
authority it needs to establish standards to honor its interna-
tional obligations, to prohibit the entry of hazardous wastes
into the country and to protect biological diversity and other
matters of national interest. If there is evidence that the
provinces are not acting competently to enforce these na-
tional standards and protect the national interest, there may
be implied authority for the national government to exercise
more direct authority in that event.
As a model of how this joint authority could be adminis-
tered, Sabsay and Walsh point to the existing system of pro-
viding harmonious and uniform tax policies throughout the
country. Under this system, tax policy is created through a
two step process. First, it is adopted by the National Con-
gress and then ratified by the provincial legislatures before it
becomes effective.
4) Article 41 contains language that requires the com-
plete remediation of environmental damage. 4 This seriously
extends the current concept of remediation which does not re-
quire a return to the status quo ante, but only imposes liabil-
ity for specific damages. Depending on how this
constitutional mandate is carried into law, it could impose
unprecedented costs on the private sector. Further, there are
no existing judicial procedures, or civil or criminal penalties,
being used in Argentina that are effective to enforce this de-
gree of remediation of environmental damage.
5) Sabsay and Walsh believe that Article 41 is too specif-
ically drawn insofar as it prohibits, as a matter of constitu-
tional law, the transport of hazardous wastes into the
country. They believe that this type of provision has no place
4. CONST. ARG., art. 41.
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in the Constitution and may violate the reciprocity clauses of
various MERCOSUR 5 and other international agreements.
6) In summarizing, Sabsay and Walsh note that these
constitutional ambiguities and conflicts place a tremendous
premium on clarity and organization in the drafting of all leg-
islation intended to discharge these newly articulated federal
and provincial duties.
5. Argentina-Brazil-Paraguay-Uruguay: Treaty Establishing a Common
Market (signed Mar. 26, 1991), U.N. Doc. A/46/155 (1991), reprinted in 30
I.L.M. 1041 (1991).
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